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The first and fundamental problem that the analysis of experience 
poses to the ethnographer is that, as the Scottish psychiatrist David 
Laing wrote, nobody can experience another person’s experience 
(cited by Kapferer, 1986: 188). How can an ethnographer know or 
enter into another person’s experience of reality? Anthropologists 
normally argue that it is only through meaning that we are able to 
perceive other people’s experiences. Unlike the event of an experience 
itself, which is always private and subjective, meanings are always 
public and intersubjective. Meanings originate in social relationships, 
and the particular kind of meanings that we anthropologists produce in 
our interpretation of other people’s ways of life originate in the 
equally very specific social relationships that we produce through our 
ethnographic practice. In this way, we can see how the unknowable of 
the personal individual experience gets refracted into a different 
dimension. This is the intersubjective dimension provided by the 
process of signification in terms of which experience becomes a form 
of communication, interaction and social relationship. 
There is, however, what we might call a second refraction of the event 
of individual private experience – a second way in which we can 
approach the analysis of experience. This is produced not by the 
intersubjective process of signification but by the objective process of 
cognition. The event of a personal experience is also a mental event 
and, as such, it is constrained by the cognitive systems that make up 
the human mind and by which information provided by the senses is 
duly processed and turned into mental representations. Whereas 
meanings are always cultural forms and, insofar as they are cultural 
forms, they are also particularistic, idiosyncratic, cognitive systems 
are universal and (largely) innate. 
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So, we have two different dimensions upon one single phenomenon, 
which is that of personal experience, something unknowable in 
principle but that can eventually be known through these two 
refractions: the intersubjective refraction, experience as meaning and 
communication, and the objective refraction, experience as cognition. 
What I would like to do in this paper is to try to bring these two 
perspectives together: mind and meaning, the mental and the social – 
two perspectives that are seen by many as pretty much antagonistic 
approaches to the study of human behaviour. 
Let me go first into the kind of experience I wish to analyse. This is 
what I define as the experience of the religious or the experience of a 
religious event. I want to draw a distinction between this and what we 
normally understand by ‘religious experience’ in the sense, for 
instance, in which it was used by William James (1982) in his well-
known essay. James understood by religious experience the 
experience of the supernatural, and he thought that that was the very 
essence of religious belief, religion in its purest form. For him, 
religion originated in that very personal, subjective and 
incommensurable feeling of a supernatural presence. This type of 
experience was different form ordinary experiences of reality, of the 
‘natural’, in that unlike these it entailed an inner transformation of the 
subject, a kind of mystical re-birth. By contrast, what I mean by the 
experience of the religious is much closer to the ordinary experience 
of natural reality. There is no inner transformation of the subject in 
this kind of experience, nor is there any suspension of our mundane 
ontological intuitions concerning the nature of the real, that is, 
ordinary reality; on the contrary, it will be precisely through these 
mundane ontological intuitions that the experience of the religious 
will be assessed and, eventually, signified. Whereas religious 
experience is an extraordinary experience brought about by the 
perception of a (believed to be) supernatural presence, the experience 
of the religious is an ordinary experience brought about by the 
perception of an event or phenomenon endowed with religious 
significance. 
The experience of the religious I wish to look at is a case of Marian 
apparition that took place in a rural parish of Co. Galway, in the west 
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of Ireland, in June, 1990. A Marian apparition is the apparition to one 
person or to a group of people, normally a very small group, of an 
image of the Virgin Mary. This supernatural event, which has been 
recurrent throughout the history of Christianity, used to be very 
common in Catholic Europe in the years after World War II – and in 
Spain in particular in the years after the Civil War. Later, irregular 
apparitions have continued to take place here and there, (nearly) 
always in Catholic countries. Perhaps one of the most famous has 
been the apparition that took place in Medjugorje, in Bosnia, in 1981. 
The apparitions I am concerned with in this paper came about on a 
wall of a little church called the Church of Our Lady Comforter of the 
Afflicted, in the half parish of Fahy, and were widely publicised in the 
local newspapers. What follows is a brief summary of the news that 
appeared in the local press shortly after the apparitions had allegedly 
taken place. 
The visions included Our Lady, Padre Pio, a baby in the womb and a 
pair of hands holding the Holy Host. The images were first noticed by 
24-year-old twins, Sally Anne and Judy Considine, form Cork, who 
had previously experienced similar visions at other places. The twins 
had visited Fahy on a number of occasions in the past and were good 
friends of the local priest, Fr Cahal Stanley. They said they noticed the 
outline of a figure on the wall beside the altar during the special mass 
on Saturday night, June the 2
nd
, and received a message from Our 
Lady. They said afterwards that they were asked to pass the message 
on, which said: ‘I ask you to renew your devotion to and adoration of 
the Blessed Eucharist’. According to Fr Stanley, ‘the Considines 
mentioned it to me after mass. I could see the image of Our Lady. We 
went outside the church and got 15 people and asked them to come in 
to look. They could all see it. At around 10 pm the image of Padre Pio 
and a pair of hands holding the host began to appear on the upper part 
of the wall’. While the images of Our Lady and the Eucharist 
disappeared later that night, Fr Stanley goes on, an enlarged outline of 
Padre Pio moved down to the lower part of the wall. The image of the 
Trinity was also to be seen. An image of the baby in the womb was 
visible at the top of the wall on Sunday, while the outline of Padre Pio 
was evident at the bottom. Local artist Sheila Haugh sketched the 
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images and her drawings were displayed in the church together with 
the messages from Our Lady. 
The messages from Our Lady were brief, and were received by the 
visionaries through ‘an inner voice’. Fr Stanley believes that She is 
encouraging people to pray and be aware of Christ and the Holy 
Sacraments. The child in the womb is a symbol of abortion – which at 
that time was still illegal in Ireland and it was a widely discussed 
topic. 
Mary Donoghue, an elderly woman from Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, was 
another witness of the visions. According to her declarations to the 
press, the visions ‘are extraordinary’. She felt that Our Lady was 
trying to tell the people of Ireland something. ‘I saw the vision of Our 
Lady and Padre Pio and the hands holding the host on Saturday. The 
more I studied it, the clearer it became, I came back again today to 
pray’. Sandra Mc Loughlin, a middle-aged woman from Ballinfoile 
Park, in Galway, went to Fahy church on Sunday with her children, 
her father Bertie Mc Donagh and friend Ann Feeney. ‘I wasn’t 20 
seconds in the church when I saw the image of the baby in the womb 
on the top left of the wall and the profile of Padre Pio in the middle. 
My father saw the baby too and my children saw Our Lady in the 
middle, Padre Pio and the unborn baby. We spend two and a half 
hours there, looking at the images and praying’. While admitting that 
she is not overly religious, Sandra says she was deeply touched by the 
experience. ‘It was a beautiful afternoon. There was a lovely scent of 
perfume in the church and the images were extraordinary. I was very 
moved and was near to tears. I will certainly go there again’. 
Fr Stanley said that the manifestations might be the result of the 
tremendous devotion to Our Lady by the people of the area. But he 
stressed that there might be a perfectly logical explanation for the 
phenomena, adding that individuals witnessed different visions since 
Saturday. ‘There may be a logical reason for all this’, Fr Stanley 
concedes, ‘it may have been caused by the paint or something. But at 
this stage is a matter for all individuals to make up their own minds.’ 
He added that the vision of Padre Pio maybe connected to the 
worldwide prayer movement to have Padre Pio canonised soon (he 
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was canonised in 2002) and he added that there was a big devotion to 
Padre Pio in that area. 
This is how the local press reported on the event in the aftermath of 
the apparitions. Next Sunday afternoon, June the 10
th
, I myself 
decided to go to the church with two friends. First, let me summarise 
again the information as it appeared in the local papers of the 14
th
 and 
15
th
 of June.  
 ‘No formal investigation has yet been begun by church authorities’, 
we read in the Connacht Tribune, one of the local papers, ‘who are 
extremely cautious about the events in Fahy’. According to Bishop 
John Kirby of Clonfert, any investigation would be long and detailed 
and the church was very cautious about such reported happenings. But 
in spite of all these cautions (or maybe because of them), next Sunday, 
June the 10
th
, the tiny village of Fahy became the scene of a mass 
pilgrimage, when thousands of people thronged into the tiny Fahy 
Church. In little more than a week, it was then estimated that 25,000 
had visited the church. The area around the church took the 
appearance of a fully-fledged pilgrimage side. A public address 
system was set up, the Rosary was recited over the loudspeaker 
system, temporary carparks where set up in the fields neighbouring 
the little church, and stewards were out on the roads leading to Fahy. 
A one-way roads system was established in a bid to deal with the huge 
crowds, but, despite this, people queued for well over an hour as 
pilgrims and sightseers waited patiently to visit the church. 
Some pilgrims said outlines on the walls and peculiarities of light still 
occur in the wall and the visionaries themselves have dismissed claims 
that they might be caused by faulty paintwork or dampness. The 
police were on duty in the village for the whole Sunday afternoon in 
an effort to keep traffic moving, temporary toilet facilities were 
provided for the public in the community hall near the church, and 
even a stall selling pictures of Padre Pio and other sacred objects had 
moved into the area in front of the church. Traffic jams half a mile 
long built up on the roads leading to the village, though special 
signposting and the cutting back of roadside briars and hedges did 
facilitate the freer movement of traffic into and out of the village, 
which had never seen such crowds. 
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I had gone to the church with two of my friends and informants, Séan 
and his wife Mary, both in their early thirties. When we arrived, both 
of them queued to enter the church while I remained outside, taking 
pictures of the pilgrims and listening to their comments. Séan was 
rather sceptical about the whole thing right from the beginning, 
whereas Mary’s attitude was somewhat more credulous. There were 
even a few bitter words between the two of them. ‘Your religion has 
always been very weak’, said Mary to her husband. ‘I am a religious 
person in my heart’, he retorted, visible irritated. Mary’s gullibility, 
however, was not exempt from doubts. ‘It might very well be in 
people’s imagination’, she conceded. ‘It would be interesting to know 
what was there a month ago, for instance’. When she came out, she 
insisted now and again that she had seen something. She said that she 
could see the womb and the child inside but that she could not see the 
image of Padre Pio. One of the stewards, she went on, was telling 
people where to look at and you were also given a leaflet with the 
drawings of the images you were supposed to see. Séan said that you 
would be needing at least an hour watching the wall to see something. 
He added that he would like to go back there after a few weeks when 
the crowds are gone. Mary asked one of the stewards where the Virgin 
was and she was told that the two white holes on the wall were her 
eyes. But there were three white holes, Séan observed, what about the 
third one? Perhaps the nose, said Mary in jest. 
While I was outside waiting for my friends, a woman coming out of 
the church said that she had seen the image of Padre Pio but she could 
not see Our Lady. There are some lines on the wall, but it is hard to 
make anything out of them, she commented. ‘It is nice to see it’. She 
asked me whether I had taken any picture inside. ‘That would have 
been a lack of respect’, the sceptical Séan contended when I put to 
him that woman’s comments. One of the stewards told me that he 
himself had seen some ‘reflections’, but that everybody sees different 
things. ‘Everybody has his own beliefs’. They all were coming out 
claiming that they had seen something, but there was no agreement as 
to what. The church was very small and there was not enough 
ventilation for such a crowd. The heat inside was unbearable, that is 
the only thing they all seemed to agree on. 
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Two weeks after the apparitions were supposed to have taken place, 
the bishop of Clonfert, Most Rev. Dr John Kirby decided to intervene. 
In a special letter read at all Masses in the Diocese of Clonfert, he said 
that the Catholic Church had always been extremely sceptical of such 
claims. It accepted that such occurrences could happen but they were 
rare and the church had to be extremely cautious of them. The bishop 
said in his Pastoral: ‘The church has always reacted very cautiously 
and prudently in regard to these claims about visions and apparitions. 
It certainly accepts the possibility of apparitions, but recognises that 
these occur only extremely rarely. They are not part of the normal 
process by which we get to know God’s will for us. We get to know 
the will of God usually through the Bible and the teaching of the 
church. Private messages are not a normal part of God’s plan. Events 
in Ireland in the last few years have shown that caution in regard to 
apparitions and the like is highly justified. It is now accepted that the 
so-called visions of recent years are largely spurious. As Bishop of 
Clonfert I recommend a sceptical approach to all recent reports. Very 
likely there are natural explanations for the events claimed to have 
occurred’. 
Official scepticism by the Catholic Church was echoed in some 
critical views. In a letter to the editor of one of the local papers, 
entitled ‘Apparitions – all a cod?’, we can read the following ironical 
comments: ‘The silly season is truly upon us; the tourists arrive for 
their annual fleecing, the polluted bay sparkles in the sunlight, and, lo 
and behold! The apparitions appear on the walls of a church. I suppose 
that statues around the country will be getting restless any day now 
(reference to another allegedly supernatural event that took place in 
Ballinspittle, Co. Cork, in the south of the country, in the mid 1980s, 
in which a statue of the Virgin Mary was supposed to move while 
people were looking at her]. In fairness, it’s a good gimmick. 
Whoever the local tourism official is, he gets full marks; this is 
cunning ploy that has proven very effective in this country. It’s just a 
pity that it involves making us look like eejits’. The letter finishes 
asking the editor why he decided to give full page coverage to such a 
nonsense. 
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So these were the facts. Let me now proceed to the analysis of these 
facts. 
First, I wish to return to the distinction I mentioned before between 
religious experience and the experience of the religious. (Remember: 
religious experience as a transformative extraordinary experience, 
truthful perception of a supernatural presence, experience of the 
religious as a mere ordinary experience of something with religious 
significance.) It might be the case that for the original visionaries 
themselves, and a few others, this was without a doubt a fully-fledged 
religious experience in the sense I have previously discussed, i.e. the 
extraordinary experience of a supernatural event. Those who reported 
having seen something ‘extraordinary’, like Mary Donoghue, or those 
who said that they had been ‘very touched and were near to tears’, like 
Sandra Mc Loughlin, were probably talking about something, 
whatever it was, that was quite different from the perception of 
ordinary reality. But such was not the situation, it seems to me, for the 
thousands of people who went to the church in the following days. 
Perhaps many of them went there with the sincere wish to perceive a 
supernatural phenomenon that would make them go through the kind 
of deep and transformative experience that we define as a religious 
experience. But for the majority, I suspect, religious experience 
remained at best (perhaps not even that) an unattainable ideal that 
could only be made up for by a mere ‘experience of the religious’. I 
am referring to all those who claimed ‘to have seen something’, but 
who could hardly understand or explain what that could be. For me 
these are sociologically and anthropologically far more important than 
the true visionaries, even though in many cases the difference between 
the two kinds of experience might not be clear cut.  
Now despite being phenomenologically very different, the two types 
of experience have something in common: in both of them there is the 
perception of an external reality (natural or supernatural). 
Furthermore, the experience of the religious does not differ in any 
significant way from ordinary experiences of natural reality. We can 
appreciate that from many of the comments people made concerning 
what they could see and what they could not see. Some saw the image 
of Padre Pio but could not see Our Lady, whereas for others it was 
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only Our Lady what they could see and nothing else, others claimed to 
have seen ‘lines’, ‘lights’, ‘reflections’, while still others doubted 
whether it was all some sort of optical illusion. People talked about 
what they had seen and about what they had not seen in the very same 
way as they talk about any other kind of perception. Since I was not 
there myself –remember I did not go into the church (and this is going 
to be significant for what I will argue later)– I cannot provide my own 
view on the situation. 
As I said at the beginning, in this analysis I will try to bring together 
two different perspectives. The first perspective consists in treating an 
experience as a mental event, i.e. something that happens in people’s 
minds (in interaction with an external stimulus, whatever that is). So 
let’s start with this definition of experience as a mental event. Now 
even though the capacity to see or not to see is closely related to a 
merely empirical fact, the object to be seen, it can also be readily 
associated with a state of mind that goes well beyond the bare 
perception of an external reality. One of the stewards said to me that 
different people saw different things, and then he added ‘everyone has 
his own beliefs’, as if the different things ‘seen’ could be explained as 
a result of the different things ‘believed’. More forcefully, my friend 
Séan’s scepticism triggered off his wife’s accusation of ‘having a 
weak religion’, as if the inability to see resulted from the lack of faith, 
or from a weak faith. All this takes us quite far indeed from ordinary 
perceptions of ordinary reality, we do not need to believe in anything 
in order to see anything. But it is this ambiguity or ambivalence, half-
way between seeing and believing, that I wish to underline. 
As Pascal Boyer (1994) has cogently argued, for any experience of a 
supernatural event to be believable, there has to be an optimum 
balance between the intuitive and the counter-intuitive. A totally 
counter-intuitive experience would be, literally, unbelievable for any 
human being, whereas an experience that perfectly matched our 
ontological intuitions concerning the nature of the real would, 
naturally enough, hardly qualify as an experience of a supernatural 
event. This balance between the intuitive and the counter-intuitive, or 
the ordinary and the extraordinary, can be readily identified, it seems 
to me, in the relationship between seeing and believing as regards the 
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particular case of supernatural apparition we have been looking at. To 
see is an ordinary perceptual faculty that we share with many other 
non-human animals, to evaluate what we see and act accordingly is a 
cognitive ability similarly widespread among the animal kingdom, 
with perhaps specific peculiarities for different species. Humans do 
not need any culture to tell them what they have in front of them, even 
though they will certainly need a language (and the culture that goes 
with it) to put a name on it. A system of cultural meanings with a 
totally contingent relationship with the underlying reality it is 
supposed to mean would not make any evolutionary sense. 
Moreover, cognitive scientists argue that humans possess a cognitive 
template that they call Hyperactive Agent Detection Device (HADD). 
This is an evolved psychological mechanism that makes the subject 
susceptible to overestimate the responsibility of agents for outcomes 
when situations do not objectively justify it (McCauley and Lawson, 
2002: 21). In other words, we are naturally more inclined to see an 
agent’s responsibility in the production of a particular event that we 
cannot account for in any other way than to see it as the result of a 
purely impersonal cause. This makes evolutionary sense in terms of a 
‘better safe than sorry’ adaptive strategy: to interpret the most little 
noise or change in the environment as having been made by a 
potentially threatening agent could have saved our ancestors from 
lurking predators or enemies (Guthrie, 1993). 
Thus, it is not only our sensorial capacity to see and, especially, to 
perceive an unexpected event and act accordingly but also our evolved 
tendency to overestimate an agent’s responsibility in the production of 
that unexpected event, which constitutes what we might call the 
cognitive basis of supernatural apparitions. This cognitive basis 
consists merely in a set of evolved pre-cultural psychological 
mechanisms the purpose of which is to process information provided 
by the senses and to stimulate a particular interpretation of that 
information so that a particular action is more likely to follow. But 
this cognitive framework does not mechanically determine an 
individual’s final beliefs and behaviour in any particular way. We 
need culture for that. We need to turn a mere psychological 
expectation or predisposition into a cultural meaning. 
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We humans always mediate the perception of our environment with a 
system of cultural representations. And it is this system of cultural 
representations that will eventually tell us whether we are in front of a 
natural or a supernatural event, or half-way between the one and the 
other. In the ethnography above, we have seen that the expectation of 
agency, the tendency to see unexpected things as resulting from 
someone’s action, does not necessarily involve that this someone, this 
agent, needs to be a supernatural agent: remember the somewhat 
bizarre conspiracy theory upheld by the sceptical writer of the letter to 
the editor of a local paper. On the other hand, it is also true that the 
possibility of a natural explanation in terms of an impersonal cause 
(dampness of the wall, etc.) was also suggested by different people, 
especially church officials. In fact, the possibility of a perfectly natural 
explanation was entertained by practically everybody – even the 
visionaries themselves had to explicitly deny that it was all caused by 
faulty paintwork or dampness – and yet, the fact that people went in 
their thousands to see the wall could in no way be explained by the 
belief in that natural explanation. In other words, people went there 
because even in some remote sense they thought (they had to think) 
that some form of ‘unnatural’ causation could be somehow present. 
In order to fully explore this attribution of cultural meaning to 
experience I would like to move now to what I have called the 
‘intersubjective refraction’ of experience, that is, the interactive 
process by which experience gains meaning. My first point is that 
culture is always interaction, relationship. In order to analyse anyone’s 
culture we need to interact with them, to relate to them. Let me just 
draw the reader’s attention to the particular interaction I had with my 
main informants on this occasion, Mary and Séan. It was me who saw 
the news on the apparition in the press and managed to persuade them 
to go to the church. It is hard to know whether they would have gone 
themselves if I had not been there to influence them to that effect. 
Whatever the case, it was clear that the reasons that moved them to go 
to the church were rather different from my own reasons to go there. 
The interesting thing is that this became very explicit when I realised 
that they did not understand why I had gone there. 
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In their view, there was a contradiction between, on the one hand, the 
fact that I asked them to go and the questions that I kept asking them 
concerning what they had seen and what they had not seen and, on the 
other, the fact that I eventually did not go inside the church to look at 
the wall. With hindsight, I tend to think that it was a mistake of my 
ethnographic practice not to have entered the church. So why is it that 
I did not enter the church? Even though I define myself as a catholic 
and a religious believer, I must say that on that occasion not for a 
single minute I entertained the possibility of a supernatural causation. 
Whatever the reasons for my scepticism (weak faith, secular 
upbringing, etc.), it was clear to me at that time that I had gone to the 
church as an anthropologist and not as a religious believer. 
Consequently, I thought that it would have been somehow dishonest 
for my part (with my friends and probably, and more decisively, with 
myself) if I had gone inside and tried to ‘see’ something that I was 
absolutely sure it was not there. 
The logical conclusion of it all is that if I was really so concerned with 
my honesty perhaps I should not have gone there, and I should not 
have persuaded them to go, in the first place. But that was precisely 
my mistake. The point I wish to make, however, are the reasons why 
my, in their view, contradictory attitude could not be understood by 
my friends. They had gone there ‘to see’ what was going on, to look at 
the wall and find out whether there was anything extraordinary to be 
noticed, and they mistakenly thought that that had been my attitude as 
well. At no time they thought – or, at least, so it seemed to me – that I 
had not gone inside because of my weak faith, lack of devotion, etc. 
because in that case I would not have bothered going to the church to 
being with – ‘he doesn’t go because he doesn’t really believe in that’. 
Whereas a religious experience is a question of believing (if you don’t 
believe in Our Lady, you will never ‘see’ her, no matter what), and a 
natural experience is a question of seeing (you don’t need to believe in 
anything to see anything), an experience of a religious event is a 
question of seeing and believing. If I had wanted to go there, that 
meant, in their view, I had some kind of belief, but then, how is it that 
‘I did not want to see’? 
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We find ourselves back to the question of perception and the 
experience of perception as it had been brought forward by what I 
dubbed the ‘objective refraction’ on experience. But this time, 
perception does not originate in a hard-wired evolved cognitive 
system. Perception is not now antecedent to cultural meaning but it 
originates in the very process of meaning production itself. Surely, the 
particular interaction I had with my informants cannot in anyway be 
generalised to the rest of the people who went there with a similar 
intention and who went through a similar experience. But in all 
appearances, judging by the information brought forward by the local 
press and the bits I gathered myself from other viewers, my 
informants’ meaningful experience was undoubtedly congruent with, 
if not equal to, many others. (And this is the way, incidentally, how I 
believe particular cultural meanings, as they originate in particular 
social interactions, can be validated, by seeing the extent to which 
they are congruent with other meanings rather than the extent to which 
they can be somehow faithfully replicated – whatever that means – in 
other interactions). 
In the process of meaning production we have been looking at, 
through the interaction of myself with my informants, it could be 
argued that some meanings were shared by Séan, Mary and myself. 
That is what enabled us to talk about the event itself in a meaningful 
way to us all. Others, however, were not shared. For me, the 
experience was closer to the ‘believing’ pole than to the ‘seeing’ pole 
and, consequently, because of my lack of belief I decided not to go 
into the church. For them, by contrast, once the belief is taken for 
granted, it was more a matter of ‘seeing’ something, or not seeing it, 
and hence they could not understand why I just ‘did not want to see’ 
(if I was a believer). 
In this paper I have tried to bring together two rather different 
perspectives on the analysis of a particular case of human experience: 
the experience of a religious event. First, the objective perspective has 
been provided by a cognitive approach, according to which our 
capacity to see and to interpret what we see, a very elementary 
capacity that we share with many other living organisms, is decisively 
and positively constrained by the evolved characteristics of our mind, 
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our inherited mental structures. Secondly, the intersubjective 
perspective has been provided by the particular interaction I had with 
the people who participated in that event, thanks to which a particular 
object of individual perception becomes an object of meaning, a 
cultural object. The only conclusion I wish to draw from the 
conflation of these two points of view is that both of them seem to be 
congruent with each other and yet irreducible. We cannot experience 
another person’s experience, I said at the beginning, we cannot see 
with another person’s eyes, the only thing we can do is try to imagine 
ourselves what it is that this or that person has seen, and try to 
understand whatever meaning that person gives to his or her 
experience – what it is that this or that person believes he or she has 
seen. 
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